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EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
Brennan v. OSH-RC (Dic-Underhill)
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)'
represents the result of numerous congressional attempts2 to estab-
lish a comprehensive plan designed to maintain a hazard-free envi-
ronment for employees.3 Despite exhaustive debates in Congress, 4
the language employed in various sections of the Act is ambiguous,
rendering much of the Act's effectiveness dependent upon judicial
interpretation. 5 One of the most critical issues yet to be resolved is
the extent of an employer's responsibility in a multiemployer pro-
ject.6 Recently, the Second Circuit, in Brennan v. OSHRC (Dic-
Underhill),7 extended the potential liability of employers in such
situations in two significant respects. The court held that an em-
ployer who controls a construction area in which a proscribed
safety hazard exists can be held to be in violation of a safety
I Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 §§ 2 et seq. [hereinafter cited as OSHA],
29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1970). See generally Gross, The Occupational Safety & Health Act: Much
Ado About Something, 3 LOYOLA CHI. L.J. 247 (1972); Moran, A Critique of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 200 (1972); Mullins, OSHA -The Federal
Government and Job Safety, 19 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 155 (1974).
2 According to Senator Yarborough, one of the sponsors of the legislation, "this national
industrial safety act is long overdue; for 30 years it has been advocated and urged." 116
CONG. REC. 41,763 (1970). For a discussion of the legislative history of the OSHA and
previously proposed health and safety legislation, see White, Occupational Safety and Health
Background Prior to the Act of 1970, in OSHA § 1.10-.11 (111. Inst. for Cont. Leg. Educ. ed.
1974).
1 As stated in the Act itself, the congressional purpose and policy of the legislation is "to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions .... OSHA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). The Act has been described
as "one of the truly great landmark pieces of social legislation in the history of this country."
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., IST SESs., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 142 (Comm. Print 1971) (remarks
of Senator Yarborough) (hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
'See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 38,378-94 (1970) (discussion of two competing safety bills); id.
at 37,605-13 (debate on creation of Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHRQ)); id. at 37,601-05 (discussion on granting power to Secretary of Labor to close
down businesses where hazard poses "imminent danger"). As Senator Javits observed,
"despite the substantial agreement which exists as to the objective of this legislation, the most
bitter labor-management political fight in years has erupted over the means to achieve that
objective." S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1970) (Individual Views of Mr. Javits).
5 One commentator has remarked that the Act "has been viewed by many as a 'lawyer's'
law since it presents many opportunities for interpretation by the legal profession." Moore,
The Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 45 WIs. B. BULL. 46 (1972).
I See generally Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 86 HARV. L. REV. 988, 998-1000 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Morey]; Note, OSHA:
Developing Outlines of Liability in Multi-Employer Situations, 62 GEo. L.J. 1483 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Developing Outlines].
7 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975). To avoid the confusion of citing to a number of cases all
of which are entitled Brennan v. OSHRC, the name of the employer has been added after
OSHRC.
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standard even though the endangered employee is in the employ
of another employer engaged in the multiemployer project.8
Moreover, mere access of an employee to the hazard was found to
be sufficient to subject an employer to the sanctions imposed by the
Act.9
Dic-Underhill, a joint venture composed of Underhill Con-
struction Corp. and Dic Concrete Corp., was engaged as a subcon-
tractor in the construction of four high-rise buildings in the Har-
lem River Park Housing Project. In November 1972, an OSHA
compliance officer, while conducting a routine inspection of the
partially constructed buildings, found violations of two regulations
setting forth standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.10
As a result, in January 1973, the Secretary cited Dic-Underhill for
"serious"" and "non-serious"' 2 violations of the regulations.
Upon Dic-Underhill's timely contest of the citation, the Secre-
tary issued a formal complaint before the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission (OSHRC), the adjudicatory body estab-
lished by the Act, and in April 1973, the case was heard by an
administrative law judge appointed by the Commission.' 3 Based
8Id. at 1038. Although the court's holding appears to indicate that a finding of control is
sufficient to impose liability, the facts in Dic-Underhill involved an employer who both
controlled and created the safety violation. Consequently, in the future, courts may interpret
Dic-Underhill as imposing creation as an added requirement.
9 Id.
10 Section 6(b) of the OSHA empowers the Secretary of Labor to promulgate safety
standards in furtherance of the purpose of the Act and prescribes the procedure by which
this is to be done. OSHA § 6(b), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1970).
The first citation issued to Dic-Underhill was for a violation of 29 C.F.R.
§ 1926.250(b)(1) (1975). This regulation provides that "[m]aterial stored inside buildings
under construction shall not be placed within 6 feet of any hoistway or inside floor openings,
nor within 10 feet of an exterior wall which does not extend above the top of the material
stored." Id. In two separate locations in the partially completed project, Dic-Underhill had
stacked material 3 to 5 feet in height, extending approximately 1 foot over the edge of a
floor which had neither an exterior wall nor a perimeter guard. Employees, although
apparently not those of Dic-Underhill, were seen working directly under the overhanging
material. 513 F.2d at 1034.
The second violation was based upon 29 C.F.R. § 1926.500(d)(1) (1975) which provides
in pertinent part that "[e]very open-sided floor ... shall be guarded by a standard railing ...
except where there is entrance to a ramp, stairway, or fixed ladder." The citation for this
violation was issued as the result of three separate incidents noted by the inspection officer.
On the 15th floor of "Building D," the officer noticed two Dic-Underhilll employees per-
forming a task which required hanging over the outer edge of the floor. On the 17th and
18th floors of "Building B," he observed Dic-Underhill's employees approximately 10 to 15
feet from the edge of the floor. Although these floors were all open sided, there was no
perimeter guard on any of them. 513 F.2d at 1035-36.
11 The OSHA states that a "serious" violation exists when there is "a substantial probabil-
ity that death or serious physical harm could result .... " OSHA § 17(k), 29 U.S.C. § 6660)
(1970).
12 A "non-serious" violation occurs when the "violation is specifically determined not to
be of a serious nature .... " Id. § 17(c), 29 U.S.C. § 666(c).
13 Once a citation is issued to an employer, id. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 658(a), the employer
1975]
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upon a finding that no Dic-Underhill employee had been exposed
to the condition allegedly amounting to the non-serious violation,
the judge held that this violation had not been established.1 4 The
serious violation was upheld, however, on the ground that five of
Dic-Underhill's employees had been exposed to a hazard created
by their employer.' 5
On review, the OSHRC summarily affirmed the administrative
law judge's disposition of both violations.1 6 Chairman Moran vig-
orously dissented from the affirmance of the serious violation,
contending that the evidence failed to demonstrate exposure of
any Dic-Underhill employee to the hazard. He concluded, there-
fore, that an essential element of the violation, namely, actual
presence within the zone of danger, was lacking.17 The Secretary of
has 15 working days after he receives the proper notification from the Secretary to inform
the Secretary that he wants to contest the citation. Id. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 659(a). With an
exception not relevant to this discussion, id. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c), if the employer fails
to notify the Secretary within this time the citation is deemed a final order of the OSHRC
and is not subject to review. Id. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 659(a). If the employer notifies the
Secretary that he wishes to contest the citation, the Secretary then notifies the OSHRC, and
the Commission grants the employer a hearing. Id. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c).
The OSHRC is an administrative body composed of three members "appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among persons who by
reason of training, education, or experience are qualified" to adjudicate proceedings insti-
tuted under the Act. Id. § 12(a), 29 U.S.C. § 661(a). The Chairman of the OSHRC appoints
administrative judges "to assist in the performance of the Commission's functions .... Id.
§ 12(e), 29 U.S.C. § 661(d). Jurisdiction over original review of the citation is vested in the
administrative judge. The judge's report becomes "the final order of the Commission" unless
any member of the Commission directs review of the report within 30 days. Id. § 12j), 29
U.S.C. § 661(i).
14 Dic-Underhill, 7 OSAHRC 137, 146-47, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 9 16,276 (Review
Comm'n Judge 1973), aff'd, 7 OSAHRC 134, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,384 (Comm'n
1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub norn. Brennan v. OSHRC (Dic-Underhill), 513 F.2d
1032 (2d Cir. 1975).
The judge's interpretation of the regulation involved constituted an alternative ground
for dismissal of the non-serious violation. He believed that the intent of the regulation was
"to prevent material from falling into openings in the floors, and not to protect material
from falling off the floors and outside the building." 7 OSAHRC at 146, 1971-1973 CCH
OSHD 16,276. Since the material here involved extended over the exterior edge of the
building, see note 10 supra, the administrative judge therefore found no violation. The
Second Circuit was quick to reject this interpretation of the regulation, holding that the
"plain language of the regulation" was dispositive. According to the court the only reason
the "exterior wall" must "extend above the top of the material stored" is to prevent the
material from falling outside the building. 513 F.2d at 1036.
15 7 OSAHRC at 145, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 16,276.
16 7 OSAHRC at 134, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,384, at 21,911-12.7l,1d. at 136-37, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,384, at 21,912 (Chairman Moran, dissent-
ing). With respect to the three employees who were working approximately 10 to 15 feet
from the unguarded edge of the floor, Chairman Moran stated:
In this case, there is no evidence that the three workers were required to move
closer than 10 feet from the floor perimeters in order to accomplish their work.
The fact that they could have moved closer is not controlling. ...
a . .Occupational safety and health standards are not building codes .... One
can violate the Occupational Safety and Health Act by failing to comply with an
occupational safety and health standard -but one cannot be in violation of a
1975] SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1974 TERM
Labor petitioned to the Second Circuit for review of the OSHRC's
dismissal of the non-serious violation, and Dic-Underhill cross-
petitioned for review of the Commission's affirmance of the serious
violation."8
The Second Circuit, therefore, was required to resolve two
issues. Initially, the court had to decide whether the sanctions
under the Act may be imposed upon mere proof of employee
access to a hazard or whether the employee's actual presence within
the zone of danger is required. The second issue facing the court
was whether a subcontractor who controls a work area in which a
safety hazard exists can be held to have violated section 5(a)(2) of
the OSHA, which obligates employers to comply with the Act's
standards, 19 upon proof that the employees of a different em-
ployer "in a common undertaking" were exposed to the hazard.20
standard unless his failure.., has thereby exposed one or more of his employees to
hazard. In other words, the standards cannot stand alone.
Id. (emphasis in original).
As to the employees leaning over the edge of the floor, Chairman Moran stated that
there was unrebutted evidence that had there been perimeter guards the employees would
not have been able to perform their work. Relying on Commission precedent, he stated that
noncompliance with a regulation may be justified if necessary to perform one's job. Id. at
135-36, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD V 17,384, at 21,912. For the reply of the Second Circuit on
this point, see note 23 infra.
"'Section I 1(a) provides in pertinent part that "[any person adversely affected or
aggrieved by an order of the Commission ...may obtain a review of such order in [a]
United States court of appeals .... OSHA § 11(a), 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970). Subdivision
(b) of this section gives the same right to the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 11(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 660(b).
i9 Section 5(a)(2) states that "[e]ach employer ... shall comply with occupational safety
and health standards promulgated under this chapter." Id. § 5(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2).
Section 5(a)(1) ("general duty" clause) presents another basis upon which liability may be
imposed. This section states that "[ejach employer.., shall furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees." Id. § 5(a)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). See generally Morey, supra note 6; White & Carney, OSHA Comes of Age:
The Law of Work Place Environment, 28 Bus. LAW. 1309, 1311-13 (1973). The dispute over the
potential liability of an employer in a multiemployer situation is, in part, a consequence of
the controversy over the applicability of the term "his employees," found in § 5(a)(1), to
§ 5(a)(2). Read literally, § 5(a)(2) requires only the violation of a standard for imposition of
liability. Reading the term "his employees" into § 5(a)(2) adds to this requirement the
additional requirement that the exposed employees be the employer's own.
20 513 F.2d at 1036. Dic-Underhill raised a number of other contentions contesting the
applicability of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.250(b)(1) (1975), the regulation pertaining to storage of
materials. The court quickly disposed of these arguments. First, Dic-Underhill contended
that the regulation did not cover its activities. For the court's resolution of this issue see note
14 supra. The Second Circuit responded to Dic-Underhill's second contention, that the
materials were not "stored" since they would shortly be used, by noting that "[a]ll construc-
tion materials are 'stored' until they are incorporated in the building ... " 513 F.2d at 1036.
Finally Dic-Underhill argued that it could permissibly violate the standard because construc-
tion operations would otherwise be hindered. In countering this argument, the court cited
the power granted the Secretary in OSHA § 6(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)-(b) (1970), to
promulgate standards and the administrative means provided by id. § 6(d), (f), 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(d), (f), to obtain variances from, or judicial review of, the standards. 513 F.2d at 1036.
These procedures would have allowed Dic-Underhill the opportunity to either exclude itself
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The court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Judge
Oakes, 2 1 affirmed the decision of the OSHRC as to the serious
violation, holding that access to the zone of danger is sufficient to
constitute proof of employee exposure. 22 In rejecting Chairman
from regulation or challenge the standard in court, thereby relieving itself of construction
hindrances. These remedies, however, are only available prior to citation. Consequently, the
Second Circuit concluded that the time for making such a claim had passed. For an
informative discussion of variances under the OSHA, see Greenfield & Secaras, Variances, in
OSHA § 6.2-.16 (Ill. Inst. for Cont. Leg. Educ. ed. 1974).
21 The Second Circuit panel consisted of Judges Oakes, Gurfein, and Medina.
22 513 F.2d at 1038-39. It may be argued that the issue of access versus actual exposure
was never reached by the Dic-Underhill court, or if the court did in fact reach the issue, that it
did so only in an ambiguous manner. Any such uncertainty regarding the court's holding
primarily stems from the fact that throughout the opinion the issue of access versus actual
exposure is treated in conjunction with the liability of an employer in a multiemployer
project. For example, in stating the holding of the court, Judge Oakes said:
[T]o draw from this a general rule that standards under the Act can be violated
only when a cited employer's own employees are shown to be directly exposed to a
violation of a standard seems to us to be wholly unwarranted.... [W]e hold that to
prove a violation of OSHA the Secretary of Labor need only show that a hazard has
been committed and that the area of the hazard was accessible to the employees of
the cited employer or those of other employers engaged in a common undertaking.
Id. at 1037-38 (emphasis added). Although the language of the court appears to acknowl-
edge two distinct standards, viz, direct exposure and access, the terms are never expressly
defined.
Further support for the argument that the Dic-Underhill court did not in fact establish a
standard of access may be gleaned from the facts of the case. It is unclear whether the
Second Circuit actually found that Dic-Underhill's employees were directly exposed to the
violation in question. If the language of the court is interpreted as saying that the employees
were directly exposed, the court's discussion of the issue of access would of course be mere
dictum.
Based on the totality of the circumstances and the opinion, however, it is submitted that
the court did in fact hold that a finding of mere access to a hazard created by a violation is
sufficient to impose liability on a cited employer. It certainly appears that the court intended
to acknowledge two opposing standards. As the court stated, to conclude that
the Act can be violated only when a cited employer's own employees are shown to
be directly exposed . . . seems ... wholly unwarranted .... [We hold that to prove a
violation of OSHA the Secretary of Labor need only show that a hazard has been
committed and that the area of the hazard was accessible to the employees of the
cited employer or those of other employers ....
Id. at 1037-38 (emphasis added).
While the terms "direct exposure" and "access" are not expressly defined in the opinion,
their definitions are not unascertainable. For a violation to be established, someone's em-
ployee must be exposed to a hazard. The question then becomes what constitutes the
definition of "exposure." Use of the adjective "direct" with the term "exposure" can only
mean that an employee must be in actual danger from the violation of a safety regulation.
On the other hand, access, by definition, obviates any need for actual exposure. Further-
more, it is not until the court discusses the holding of Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504
F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974), a case which specifically examined the issue of access versus actual
(direct) exposure, that the Second Circuit begins to employ the term "access." 513 F.2d at
1037. If the Second Circuit was not deciding this issue, then there would have been no need
to quote what it termed the "cogent observations" of the Gilles & Cotting court concerning
access versus actual exposure. Id. at 1037 n.9. After presenting the distinction that the
Fourth Circuit had developed between access and actual presence within the zone of danger,
it is highly improbable that the court would then, without clarification, use the term "accessi-
ble" to mean something else.
Having established that the Second Circuit did intend to address the issue of access
versus direct exposure, it must be further determined whether this was part of its holding or
mere dictum. Admittedly, with respect to the non-serious violation, it was dictum, for the
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Moran's contention that actual presence within the zone of danger
is necessary to establish a violation,23 Judge Oakes relied upon both
the legislative history of the OSHA and judicial precedent.2 4 Ac-
cordingly, he based his opinion on the belief that the "keystone of
the Act . . . is preventability.
25
Apparent inconsistency permeates the OSHRC decisions on
the question of what constitutes exposure to a hazard. 26 In defining
exposure, the Commission has vacillated between a standard of
access to the zone of danger and a standard of actual presence
within the zone of danger.27 Prior to Dic-Underhill, the only circuit
Second Circuit found that Dic-Underhill's employees were "observed passing or working"
directly below the hazard. Id. at 1038. Nevertheless, the language of the court certainly
appears to indicate that had there only been evidence of access the court still would have
affirmed the violation: "[M]aterial overhanging a floor of a . . .building project Ereates a
hazard to employees on the job site who work or may work below the material." Id. (emphasis
added).
With respect to the serious violation, both Chairman Moran, in his dissent, 7 OSAHRC
at 134-37, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,384, at 21,912 (Chairman Moran, dissenting), noted
in Brennan v. OSHRC (Dic-Underhill), 513 F.2d 1032, 1036 n.7 (2d Cir. 1975), and
Dic-Underhill in its brief, Brief for Dic-Underhill at 16-18, Brennan v. OSHRC (Dic-
Underhill), 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975), raised the contention that the employees who were
10 to 15 feet from the edge of the open-sided floor perimeters were not directly exposed to a
safety hazard. Additionally, the OSHRC has previously held that being 10 feet from the
edge of an open-sided floor perimeter does not constitute direct exposure. A. Munder &
Son, Inc., - OSAHRC -, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 9 15,757 (Review Comm'n Judge 1973),
review ordered, 3 CCH EMP. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH OSHD) 7995, at 5923 (Comm'n
1975). Although Judge Oakes never discussed this issue, it is highly unlikely, especially in
light of the positions mentioned above, that the court would now hold 10 to 15 feet to be
direct exposure without explicitly so stating. Furthermore, the court emphasized the prevent-
ative nature of the Act, stating that "[tihe legislative history is supportive of the proposition
that actual observed danger is unnecessary." 513 F.2d at 1039 (emphasis added).
23 513 F.2d at 1039. The court also rejected Chairman Moran's contention that there
was insufficient evidence to prove the violation with respect to the employees leaning over
the edge of the floor. See note 17 supra. It has been established that it is a defense to a
violation if adherence to the regulation would create an impossibility of performance. See,
e.g., DeLuca Constr. Co., 2 OSAHRC 435, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,394 (Review
Comm'n Judge 1973) (violations pertaining to unguarded elevator shaft and unguarded
material hoists vacated where barricades removed so that work could be performed); La Sala
Contracting Co., 2 OSAHRC 976, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,492 (Review Comm'n Judge
1973) (citation for failure to guard elevator shaft vacated because barricade was removed to
permit bricklayers to perform their work). However, citing to OSHA § 12(g), 29 U.S.C.
§ 661(f) (1970), and FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c), the court noted that to show that the work could not
otherwise have been done is "at most an affirmative defense" which Dic-Underhill had failed
to establish. 513 F.2d at 1035, citing NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
24 513 F.2d at 1038-39. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text infra.
25 513 F.2d at 1039, citing National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). For an extensive discussion of National Realty, see Satter, Shedding Some Light on
the Burden of Proof in Demonstrating a Violation of the General Duty Clause of OSHA: National
Realty, 15 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 1075 (1974).26 See Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1266 (4th Cir. 1974).
27 For example, in J.E. Roupp & Co., 7 OSAHRC 919, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,660
(Comm'n 1974), the OSHRC summarily affirmed the administrative judge's decision that
employees of a cited employer must actually be exposed to the hazards. Commissioner
Cleary in partial dissent, however, criticized the majority for holding that" 'actual' exposure
is required before a violation will be found." Id. at 923, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,660, at
22,069 (Comm'r Cleary, dissenting). In Everhart Steel Constr. Co., 16 OSAHRC 700,
1975]
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court which had directly addressed itself to this issue was the
Fourth Circuit, in Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc.28 There, the
administrative law judge, having found that Gilles & Cotting's em-
ployees had access to the zone of danger, held Gilles & Cotting
liable for violations pertaining to the maintenance of scaffolding
assemblies. 2 9 In a two to one decision, the OSHRC reversed.3 0 The
Commission majority, not expressly dealing with the issue of access
as opposed to presence within the zone of danger, referred to it
only obliquely, saying that "no employee of this Respondent [Gilles
& Cotting] was affected by any alleged unsafe condition of the
scaffold."'31 Although a rejection of the access doctrine may be
implied from this language, the term "affected" employed by the
Commission is ambiguous and leaves room for doubt as to whether
rejection was its intention.
The Fourth Circuit, recognizing this ambiguity, was uncertain
whether the OSHRC was rejecting the access approach, and if so,
whether the Commission was necessarily establishing an actual
presence requirement.3 2 Judge Winter, speaking for the court,
espoused policy arguments with regard to both standards33 and
1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,062 (Review Comm'n Judge 1973), aff'd, 16 OSAHRC 696, 3
CCH Emp. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH OSHD) 19,513 (Comm'n 1975), an electric drill
not properly grounded was held to be a violation because it was accessible to employees. For
further illustrations of the inconsistent views voiced by the OSHRC, see Arizona Pub. Serv.
Co., 4 OSAHRC 1229, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 16,800 (Comm'n 1973) (violation vacated
since employee who stopped 3 feet away from lightning arrester could come within 2 feet
before actual exposure to hazard), A. Munder & Son, Inc., - OSAHRC-, 1971-1973 CCH
OSHD $ 15,757 (Review Comm'n Judge 1973), reiew ordered, 3 CCH Emp. SAFETY & HEALTH
GUIDE (CCH OSHD) T 7995, at 5923 (Comm'n 1975) (perimeter guards absent on open-
sided floors not a violation because no employee within 10 feet of perimeter and therefore
within zone of danger); Ellison Elec., I OSAHRC 547, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD $ 15,133
(Review Comm'n Judge 1972) (citation for stairways erected in violation of safety standard
vacated because of failure to show actual use of stairways); and Allied Elec. Co., 1 OSAHRC
440, 451, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,103 (Review Comm'n Judge 1972) (dictum) (access
sufficient).
28 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974).
21 Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 4 OSAHRC 1084, 1094, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD T 15,140, at
20,216 (Review Comm'n Judge 1972), rev'd, 4 OSAHRC 1080, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD
9 16,763 (Comm'n 1973), rev'd and remanded, 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974). Although it is
debatable whether the judge found that the employees having access to the hazard were
those of Gilles & Cotting or those of another employer on the site, the Fourth Circuit
proceeded on the assumption that they were Gilles & Cotting's employees. 504 F.2d at 1263.
0 4 OSAHRC at 1080, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD V 16,763. The Commission majority
consisted of Chairman Moran and Commissioner Van Namee. Commissioner Cleary dis-
sented.
31 Id. at 1080, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 9 16,763, at 21,512.
32 504 F.2d at 1264 & n.6.
" The question . .. is important to enforcement of the Act. If access alone is
sufficient to show a violation, the Secretary will often be able to make out a case
solely on the basis of the testimony of the compliance officer. If, however, proof of
employee presence in the zones of danger is required, then unless the compliance
officer chances to see employees in a danger zone at the time of his inspection, the
Secretary will have to depend on workers' willingness to testify against their em-
ployers under the anti-retribution umbrella of § I l(c)(1) of the Act. Recalcitrant
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ultimately stated that the issue could "be answered either way
consistent with the statutory purposes of the Act. ' 34 Concluding
that resolution of this issue should be entrusted to the OSHRC, the
Fourth Circuit remanded the issue to the Commission for an "ex-
press decision of the issue of 'access' versus 'actual exposure.' "35
In holding that access alone is sufficient, the Second Circuit
accentuated the fact that a major emphasis of the Act is the preven-
tion of safety hazards and, thereby, the protection of workers.
Although the OSHA does not expressly address the issue, sections
of the Act do indicate that potential exposure to a hazard is
sufficient to establish a violation. 36 Additionally, the legislative his-
tory of the OSHA lends support to the conclusion that access to the
zone of danger is sufficient. Stating that the primary objective of
the legislation is the prevention of death and disability, the House
Labor Committee urged that adequate warning of possible hazards
be guaranteed.37 Finally, there is case law at the Commission level
which provides support for the Second Circuit's conclusion. 38 In
adopting a standard of access, it would appear that the Second
Circuit has provided an interpretation which will better effectuate
the purposes of the Act.
In determining Dic-Underhill's liability for the non-serious
violation, the Second Circuit faced the question of whether an
employer may be cited for a violation if the only employees ex-
employers may be able to impede enforcement of the Act by refusing to correct
safety violations disclosed by an inspection unless for each and every violation the
Secretary is able to marshal employee testimony ....
Id. at 1263.34 1d.
35 Id. at 1264. The court remanded for two reasons: (1) an administrative agency must
explain why they rejected the holding of an administrative judge; and (2) the agency must
give reasons to account for a change in "policies or rules apparently dispositive of a case." Id.
36 Section 5(a)(1) of the Act uses the phrase "likely to cause death or serious physical
harm." OSHA § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added). Section 8(f) allows
employees to request an inspection if they believe a hazard exists which threatens harm. Id.
§ 8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 657(f). Section 17(k) defines a "serious" violation as one which "could result"
in serious harm. Id. § 17(k), 29 U.S.C. § 666() (emphasis added).
" The Second Circuit noted that the House Labor Committee had said:
Death and disability prevention is the primary intent of this bill. Although possible
penalties for violations may be an important deterrent, they are only a partial
solution. If we are to reduce disabilities and fatalities, it is essential that we guaran-
tee adequate warning of possible hazards.
513 F.2d at 1039, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1970) (emphasis
added by Second Circuit). See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 149-50, 152-54,
851-53, 855-59.31See cases cited note 27 supra. In Allied Electric Co., I OSAHRC 440, 1971-1973 CCH
OSHD 15,103 (Review Comm'n Judge 1972), Administrative Law Judge Burroughs stated:
It would be an undue burden ... to require a showing of actual use .... Any such
requirement would cause the compliance officer to wait around in hopes of some-
one using the equipment. This would result in a cat-and-mouse game .... More
importantly, it would expose an employee to a hazard prior to the Secretary being
able to require it to be corrected.
Id. at 451, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,103.
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posed to the hazard are those of another employer in a mul-
tiemployer situation. One reason the OSHRC had dismissed the
non-serious violation was because it had found that none of Dic-
Underhill's employees were exposed to the hazard. 39 In reversing
the dismissal, the Second Circuit agreed with the Secretary of
Labor's view that an employer in control of and thereby responsi-
ble for the maintenance of an area should be held liable for a
violation of section 5(a)(2) despite the fact that none of his own
employees were exposed.4 °
Throughout its short history, the OSHRC has continually held
that an employer will not be liable for a violation of the OSHA if
his own employees are not exposed to the hazard.4 1 One of the
earliest Commission decisions propounding this view is City Wide
Tuckpointing Service Co. 42 There, the administrative judge had held
the company to be in violation of five occupational safety and
health standards promulgated under the OSHA.43 The OSHRC
upheld four of the violations, but reversed the holding of the judge
on the fifth, 44 finding that the respondent's employees were not
endangered by the safety violation. The Commission held that
"[o]nly where employees of a cited employer are affected by non-
compliance with an occupational safety and health standard can
such employer be in violation of section 5(a)(2) of this Act."'45
Section 5(a)(1), known as the "general duty" clause, provides
that "[e]ach employer . . . shall furnish to each of his .employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from rec-
ognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause ... harm to
his employees. 46 Although the term "his employees" is not found in
section 5(a)(2), the Commission in City Wide impliedly imposed this
qualification in interpreting that section. Applying this limitation in
conjunction with an interpretive regulation issued by the Secretary
of Labor,47 Chairman Moran explained that to hold differently "on
39 7 OSAHRC at 134, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,384, at 21,911.
40 513 F.2d at 1037-38.
41 See, e.g., Martin Iron Works, Inc., 9 OSAHRC 695, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 18,164
(Comm'n 1974) (subcontractor not in violation of safety regulations where none of its
employees exposed to improperly guarded 8 by 4 foot floor opening); Humphreys &
Harding, Inc., 8 OSAHRC 304, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,784 (Comm'n 1974) (general
contractor not in violation of guardrail requirements where only subcontractor's workers
exposed to hazard).
42 3 OSAHRC 194, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,769 (Comm'n 1973), aff'g in part and
rev'g in part 3 OSAHRC 196, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,193 (Review Comm'n Judge
1972).
4 3 OSAHRC at 196, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,193.
44 The Commission sat as a quorum of two consisting of Chairman Moran and Commis-
sioner Van Namee. Commissioner Cleary was not present.
45 3 OSAHRC at 196, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,769, at 21,051.
46 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
47 3 OSAHRC at 195, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,769, at 21,051. The regulation issued
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the basis of the facts in this case would be an expansion of the
intent and purpose of the Act."48
Approximately one year later, in Hawkins Construction Co., 49 the
Commission majority reiterated its position on this issue and fur-
ther explained its rationale. Hawkins, the general contractor, had
dug a large excavation without adhering to safeguards required by
the OSHA. Consequently, an employee of a subcontractor was
killed when the excavation caved in. The citation against Hawkins
was vacated, however, because none of Hawkins' employees had
been at the excavation site for weeks, and therefore, none were
exposed to the noncomplying conditions. Chairman Moran, in pre-
senting the majority view, maintained that the responsibility must
fall upon the employer who had control over the exposed employ-
ees rather than on the employer who had created the hazardous
condition. 50
Notwithstanding the Commission's purported recognition of
the remedial nature of the Act,5' its interpretation of section 5(a)(2)
seems to unduly constrict the intended operation of that section.
By engrafting upon section 5(a)(2) the section 5(a)(1) "his employ-
ees" limitation, the Commission has predicated section 5(a)(2) liabil-
ity on the existence of an employee-employer relationship,52 there-
by obfuscating the seemingly clear language of that section which
solely obligates each employer to comply with standards promul-
gated under the Act. In addition to limiting the application of
section 5(a)(2) to situations involving a direct employee-employer
relationship, the Commission has further restricted the Act by
adopting a narrow definition of that relationship. Although it has
stated that the employment relationship should not be defined
by the Secretary states that "[i]n the event a standard protects on its face a class of persons
larger than employees, the standard shall be applicable under this part only to employees
and their employment and places of employment." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(d) (1975). Chairman
Moran felt that this regulation limited liability under the OSHA to the situation where an
employee of the cited employer is exposed to a violation of a safety standard. 3 OSAHRC at
195, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD $ 15,769, at 21,051. The Second Circuit, however, did not
believe the regulation should be construed so narrowly as to exclude from the protection of
the Act, merely because their employer was not cited, employees whose safety was jeopar-
dized. It took the position that the regulation protected all employees on a particular
worksite, but excluded pedestrians or "unrelated third persons" who might be passing by or
through the location. 513 F.2d at 1038 n.10.
1 3 OSAHRC at 195, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,769, at 21,051.
49 8 OSAHRC 569, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD $ 17,851 (Comm'n 1974).
50Id. at 570-71, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,851, at 22,196.
" Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 4 OSAHRC 1080, 1082, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 16,763, at
21,513 (Comm'n 1973).
"See, e.g., Hawkins Constr. Co., 8 OSAHRC 569, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,851
(Comm'n 1974); Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 4 OSAHRC 1080, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 16,763
(Comm'n 1973); City Wide Tuckpointing Serv. Co., 3 OSAHRC 194, 1971-1973 CCH
OSHD 5 15,769 (Comm'n 1973).
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according to common law concepts, 53 it appears that the Commis-
sion majority has adopted the common law definitions of "master"
and "servant. ' 54 While this may be suitable for tort law, it fails to
effectuate the intent of the OSHA55 and does not take cognizance
of judicial precedent requiring that in social legislation the defini-
tions of employee and employer be determined in light of the
legislation's purpose. 56
One alternative was suggested by Commissioner Cleary, in his
dissent in Hawkins, when he stated that the "only meaningful ap-
proach" to this issue is to determine which employer has control
over the worksite as well as control over the workers and therefore
"the capacity and the legal obligation to prevent unsafe working
conditions. ' 57 The dissent forcefully asserted that for purposes of
the Act a prime contractor should be considered the joint employer
of a subcontractor's employees if he has the power to direct their
activities. 58 Sharply criticizing the Commission majority, Commis-
53 Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 4 OSAHRC 1080, 1082, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 1 16,763, at
21,513 (Comm'n 1973).
341d. at 1082-83, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 16,763, at 21,513.
55 See Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Law of Torts, in
Symposium on Occupational Safety and Health, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 612, 639 (1974).
5
'
6 See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). Hearst contended that
since Congress did not explicitly define the term "employee" it should be derived from
common law standards. Id. at 119-120. The Supreme Court replied that the term "'takes
color from its surroundings' " and derives meaning from the purpose to be achieved by the
statute. Id. at 124, quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 545
(1940); accord, United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 711-13 (1947) (definition of employees
tinder Social Security Act); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1947)
(definition of employees under Fair Labor Standards Act).
57 8 OSAHRC at 572, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,851, at 22,197 (Comm'r Cleary,
dissenting).
11 Id. While the position propounded by Commissioner Cleary in Hawkins would serve to
eliminate obstacles to enforcement in a situation involving a general contractor and a
subcontractor, it would be inapplicable in a Dic-Underhill situation where only two subcon-
tractors are involved. It is submitted, however, that Commissioner Cleary's position in
Hawkins was so restricted because of the facts of the case.
Interestingly, in Martin Iron Works, Inc., 9 OSAHRC 695, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD
18,164 (Comm'n 1974), Commissioner Cleary, again dissenting, argued to extend liability to
a subcontractor who endangered another subcontractor's employees. Although indicating
that § 5(a) might also support such an extension, he based the extension of liability on OSHA
§ 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1970), asserting that § 9(a) is broader than § 5(a) and "permits a
citation for violation of a standard even when there is no violation of section 5(a)." 9
OSAHRC at 697, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 18,164, at 22,342 (Comm'r Cleary, dissenting).
In so extending liability, Commissioner Cleary stated:
To find that respondent is an employer subject to citation under section 9(a), it is
sufficient that respondent, a subcontractor on a construction site, removed the plate
at the request of a second subcontractor at the site, creating a violation of a
standard to which employees of a third subcontractor were exposed.
hi. at 698, 1973-1974 CCHOSHD 18,164, at 22,342 (Comm'r Cleary, dissenting). To the
extent that Commissioner Cleary's proposed expansion of the employee-employer relation-
ship results in extended liability, it deserves credit. His logic, however, appears somewhat
faulty. Section 9(a) is merely the section which grants to the Secretary of Labor the authority
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sioner Cleary concluded that they ignored the "realities of the
construction industry" and the "purpose of the Act."59
In Gilles & Cotting, the Fourth Circuit, like the Commission in
Hawkins, was faced with the issue of whether a general contractor
could be held in violation of a safety standard when the only
employees known to be exposed to the hazard were those of a
subcontractor. In upholding the citations against Gilles & Cotting,
the administrative judge rested his decision on the ground that all
employees at the worksite had access to the hazard.60 In support of
his conclusion the judge opined that "in an operation such as here
involved in the construction of a building where subcontractors are
also used it is logical and necessary that overall safety and accident
prevention be the responsibility of the general contractor."'6 1 The
OSHRC reversed the administrative judge on the ground that no
exposure of Gilles & Cotting's employees to the safety violations
was proved 62 and that the Act was not intended to impose liability
on an employer if his employees were not exposed to the hazard.
63
The Fourth Circuit held that a regulation promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor had narrowed the issue to whether or not
general contractors are joint employers of a subcontractor's em-
ployees. 64 Although disputing the basis upon which the OSHRC
had rested its decision, the Fourth Circuit negatived the implica-
tions of this disagreement by holding that the issue could be de-
cided either way consonant with the purposes of the OSHA.65 The
court further stated that determination of the issue is properly
within the agency's discretion. 66 Rejecting the contention of the
Secretary of Labor that the issue should be left to his discretion, the
Fourth Circuit held that the concern here was "the power to adopt
rules or policies in adjudication"67 and accordingly deferred to the
Commission.
to issue citations, whereas § 5 establishes the duties that employers have under the Act. It is
submitted that any extension of liability must therefore stem from § 5.
59 8 OSAHRC at 572, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,851, at 22,197 (Comm'r Cleary,
dissenting).
60 4 OSAHRC at 1094, 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,140, at 20,215-16.
" Id., 1971-1973 CCH OSHD 15,140, at 20,216.
62 4 OSAHRC at 1080, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 16,763, at 21,512.
63 Id. at 1081-83, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 16,763, at 21,512-13.
64 504 F.2d at 1260 & n.2. In arriving at the conclusion that the issue to be resolved is
whether general contractors should be considered the joint employers of a subcontractor's
employees, the Fourth Circuit appears to have adopted an interpretation of the applicable
regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(d) (1975), similar to that propounded by the OSHRC. The
Commission's interpretation of the regulation is set forth in note 47 supra.
65 504 F.2d at 1261.
6 61Id. at 1261-62.6 7 1d. at 1262 (emphasis in original).
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In contrast, the Dic-Underhill court refused to subordinate its
views to that of the Commission. 68 Although Judge Oakes con-
ceded that the Commission's interpretation could find some sup-
port in section 5(a)(1) of the Act, he did not consider this finding
dispositive. 69 He noted that Dic-Underhill was cited under section
5(a)(2) and that the language of this section requires only that an
employer fail to obey the safety standards promulgated under the
Act.7 0 Again relying on congressional intent, the Second Circuit
based its reversal of the Commission's dismissal of the non-serious
violation on the ground that a broad interpretation of the Act is
necessary to effectuate its remedial purpose. 71
In deciding that control of employees should not be the sole
criterion, the Second Circuit rejected the test of whose employee is
endangered and instead established control over the work area as
the determinative factor.7 2 It is submitted that in doing so the court
68 The Second Circuit believed that it was applying a different scope of review than that
applied by the Fourth Circuit:
We have taken the view, in contradistinction to that of the Fourth Circuit, that our
role "is to decide whether the Commission's interpretation of the Regulation is
unreasonable and inconsistent with its purpose, the normal standard for review of
the interpretation of a regulation by the agency charged with its administration."
513 F.2d at 4038, quoting Brennan v. OSHRC (Gerosa, Inc.), 491 F.2d 1340, 1344 (2d Cir.
1974). It is submitted, however, that although the courts differed in their interpretation of
the regulation, they applied the same standard of review. The Second Circuit found "the
Commission's narrow interpretation of the construction regulations unreasonable," 513 F.2d
at 1038, while the Fourth Circuit felt that "the question ... [could] be answered either way
... [and] the choice . . . [was] appropriately committed to [the Commission]." 504 F.2d at
1261-62.
69513 F.2d at 1037.70 Id. at 1037-38. It is submitted that § 5(a)(1) was created solely to supplement § 5(a)(2),
not to limit its application.
The committee recognizes that precise standards to cover every conceivable situa-
tion will not always exist. This legislation would be seriously deficient if any em-
ployee were killed or seriously injured on the job simply because there was no
specific standard applicable to a recognized hazard ....
. . . Employers have primary control of the work environment and should
insure that it is safe and healthful. Section 5(a)(1) . . . merely restates that each
employer shall furnish this degree of care.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 149.
7' 513 F.2d at 1038-39. The OSHA has unanimously been considered remedial legisla-
tion, see, e.g., Brennan v. OSHRC (Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.), 505 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir.
1974); Brennan v. OSHRC (Gerosa, Inc.), 491 F.2d 1340, 1343 (2d Cir. 1974); 116 CONG.
REc. 37,628-30 (1970) (remarks of Senator Cranston), and should therefore be broadly and
liberally interpreted in accordance with its nature. See, e.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65
(1968) (statute granting standing to petition for writ of habeas corpus construed broadly in
keeping with remedial legislation); A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)
(exemption from remedial statute construed narrowly so as not to frustrate intent of
Congress); F. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 70, at 140 (1953).
72 Although the Second Circuit was the first court to utilize the "control of the worksite"
test, a similar approach had previously been suggested: "Any employer (prime or subcon-
tractor) who creates a hazard which endangers employees (whether his own or those of
another employer) will be cited." Brady, The New Occupational Safety and Health Act -Its
Impact on Contractors and Sureties, 8 THE FORUM 114, 121 (1972), quoting OFFICE OF CoMI-
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has rectified various anomalies which have arisen under the Com-
mission's test.73 In Hawkins, the general contractor created a spe-
cifically proscribed hazard and yet was absolved from responsibility
because his employees had subsequently left the jobsite to the
subcontractors. Conversely, in other OSHRC cases, subcontractors
whose employees were employed in an area where there was a
violation were compelled to accept responsibility notwithstanding
the fact that the general contractor who created the hazard was
absolved.7 4
The anomaly becomes especially apparent where, as in Dic-
Underhill, a hazard which endangers another subcontractor's workers
is actively maintained by the controlling subcontractor. In such
situations the subcontractor is virtually remediless. Only infre-
quently will he be able to inspect the operations of the controlling
employer, and even where he is cognizant of the hazard, he is not
normally empowered to order the other party to abate the viola-
tion. To protect his employees, he must either withdraw them from
the worksite and risk a civil suit or file a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor in an attempt to obtain an official inspection of
the construction area. 75 In establishing a standard pursuant to
which control over the workplace alone can give rise to liability, the
Second Circuit has provided a general deterrent to exposing any
employee on a worksite to safety hazards, rather than the limited
deterrent to exposing only one's own employee.
To relieve employers from any liability when they have control
over proscribed hazard is to undercut the purposes of the OSHA.
The grudging approach taken by the OSHRC in prior decisions
and acquiesced in by the Fourth Circuit in Gilles & Cotting fails to
recognize the remedial intent of the Act. In contradistinction,
Dic-Underhill represents an important judicial step forward in im-
plementing the comprehensive type of safety legislation that Con-
gress had desired when it passed the OSHA.
Andrew W. Klein
PLIANCE, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CoM-
PLIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAL VII-7 (1972).
73 See generally Developing Outlines, supra note 6, at 1495-96; Greenberg, OSHA: More
Headaches for the Building Industry, 7 PUB. CONTRACT L.J. 106, 114-15 (1974).
74 See, e.g., J.E. Roupp & Co., 7 OSAHRC 919, 1973-1974 CCH OSHD 17,660
(Comm'n 1974).
7- Section 8(f)(1) provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny employees ... who believe that a
violation of a safety or health standard exists that threatens physical harm ... may request
an inspection by giving notice to the Secretary .... OSHA § 8(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1)
(1970).
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